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ABSTRACT 
At least since 1819, courts have prohibited double patenting—where 
an inventor has two patents on the same or obvious variations of the same 
invention. There have always been two basic justifications for prohibiting 
double patenting. The first focused on the patentee: bad actors might try 
to improperly extend their patent monopoly by filing serial applications. 
The second focused on the public’s rights: the bargain of the patent is that 
in exchange for the inventor getting a term-limited patent, the public is 
entitled to use the claimed invention (and its obvious variations) once the 
patent expires. This public-rights rationale is broader, and it applies 
independent of whether the patentee’s filing of serial applications allows 
her to extend the patent term. 
The patentee-based justification had more purchase in the olden 
days—when a patent’s term was determined by its issue date. Every new 
patent that issued would get a new term. Since 1995, though, a patent’s 
term is 20 years from the earliest effective filing date—a date that stays 
the same independent of whether the inventor strings out her patent 
applications—so the inventor cannot really game the system. On the other 
hand, the public still cannot receive the fruit of its bargain if it cannot use 
a claimed invention as soon as a patent expires. 
The previously low-stakes debate about the reason for prohibiting 
double patenting now matters. Most significantly, is there a double-
patenting problem for a parent patent where the parent gets patent-term 
adjustment, but the child does not? On the patentee-based justification, 
there may well not be a problem for the parent, but on the public-rights 
based justification, there would be. Inventors that receive patent-term 
adjustment on a parent patent have to decide whether to pursue 
continuation applications, as continuation applications are likely to not 
receive the same amount of adjustment. Depending on how the law on 
double patenting evolves, the continuation patents may cut short the term 
of the parent patent—what this article will call patent patricide. For 
2
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patents on pharmaceutical drugs, the question of patent patricide can be 
worth billions of dollars. 
INTRODUCTION 
At least since 1819,1 courts have prohibited “double patenting”—
where an inventor has two patents on the same or obvious variations of 
the same invention. There have always been two basic justifications for 
prohibiting double patenting. The first focuses on the patentee: bad actors 
may try to improperly extend their monopoly by filing serial applications. 
The second focuses on the public’s rights: the bargain of the patent is that 
in exchange for the inventor getting a term-limited patent, the public is 
entitled to use claimed inventions (and obvious variations thereof) once 
patents expire. This public-rights rationale is broader, and it applies 
independent of whether double patenting allows a patentee to extend her 
term. 
However justified, the prohibition on double patenting was 
particularly important back when a patent’s term was tied to its issue date. 
If an inventor kept getting patents on the same subject matter—each one 
expiring later and later—the patentee would be able to extend her patent 
monopoly beyond its statutory term, and the public would not be able to 
reap the benefits of its bargain. 
The patentee-based justification for prohibiting double patenting 
nowadays, when a patent’s term is twenty years from filing, is of more 
“limited force.”2 Bad-acting patentees are generally unable to extend their 
exclusivity by filing more and more patents since the new patents’ terms 
will be limited by the filing dates of the original patents. On the other 
hand, the public still cannot receive the fruits of its bargain if it cannot use 
a claimed invention as soon as a patent expires. Thus, the previously 
inconsequential ivory-tower debate about why obviousness-type double 
patenting (ODP) is prohibited now matters. Most significantly, inventors 
that receive a patent-term adjustment on a parent patent have to decide 
whether to pursue continuation applications,3 as continuation applications 
are likely not going to receive patent-term adjustments. Depending on 
* Dr. Kazhdan is an Associate Solicitor at the United States Patent and Trademark Office. The views 
and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the views or opinions of the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office. Kazhdan thanks Dmitry Karshtedt and Thomas Krause 
for their helpful and thoughtful comments on this article and thanks the editors of the Akron Law 
Review for their exceptional job editing. 
1. Odiorne v. Amesbury Nail Factory, 18 F. Cas. 578, 579 (C.C.D. Mass. 1819) (No. 10,430). 
2. In re Fallaux, 564 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
3. See infra Section I.C.
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how the law on double patenting evolves, the continuation patents may 
cut short the term of the parent patent—what this article will call “patent 
patricide.” For patents on pharmaceutical drugs, the question of patent 
patricide can be worth billions of dollars. 
This article proceeds as follows. Section I provides a primer on 
patent prosecution and double patenting. In Section II, the article 
describes the various reasons courts have given for prohibiting double 
patenting: some courts believe that double patenting would extend the 
patentee’s monopoly beyond her permitted term, while others believe it 
would violate the public’s right to freely use inventions claimed in expired 
patents. As this article will show, the Patent Act assumes a patentee-based 
reason, but the Code of Federal Regulations has provisions that make 
sense only with a public-rights justification. Section III explains that the 
choice of rationale has significant implications for earlier-issued but later-
expiring patents—particularly for cases of patent patricide—and different 
tribunals have come to different conclusions. Finally, Section IV 
concludes that allowing patent patricide creates strange and unnecessary 
problems. Instead, a patent’s term should be set when it issues—so a later-
issuing continuation application should not be able to cut short the term 
of the parent. 
I. A PRIMER ON DOUBLE PATENTING 
Sections II through IV assume an understanding of patent terms, 
patent prosecution, and double patenting. This section explains those 
concepts. 
A. Patent Term 
From 1790 to 1994, a patent’s term was keyed to when the patent 
issued: patents that issued between 1790 and 1835 were valid for 14 years 
from issuance; patents that issued between 1836 and 1860 were valid for 
21 years from issuance; and patents that issued between 1861 and 1994 
were valid for 17 years from issuance.4 The nice thing about patent terms 
being keyed to the patent’s issue date was that an inventor would get the 
same patent term no matter how long it took the Patent Office to issue the 
patent. 
In 1994, Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
(URAA). Under the URAA, patents filed in 1995 or later expire 20 years 
4. Neel U. Sukhatme, Regulatory Monopoly and Differential Pricing in the Market for
Patents, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1855, 1895–96 n.146 (2014).  
4
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from when the patent was filed (or its effective filing date—as described 
below).5 If it takes three years for the Patent Office to issue a patent, then 
that works out to be the same term—17 years from issuance—as before. 
However, if the Patent Office takes much longer, then the inventor will 
not get a reasonable term. As an extreme example, if the Patent Office 
takes 20 years to issue a patent, the patent will expire before it is even 
issued. Congress therefore enacted various bases for adjusting a patent’s 
term to account for Patent Office delay. Already in 1994, with the 
enactment of the URAA, Congress provided patent-term adjustment 
(PTA) to account for the time lost during review by the Patent Office’s 
Board of Appeals and Interferences.6 Since then, Congress has allowed 
for PTA based on other Patent Office delays as well.7 
The Patent Act also provides for extending a patent to make up for 
delay at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Before an 
innovator company can market a new drug, it needs approval from the 
FDA.8 Sometimes, the FDA-approval process can interfere with a 
company’s ability to recoup the money it invested in developing a drug. 
As the Supreme Court has explained, “the ‘clock’ on [an inventor’s] 
patent term will be running even though he is not yet able to derive any 
profit from the invention” because the government has not yet approved 
it.9 Consider, for example, a company that invents a new drug and files 
both a patent application and a request for FDA approval of that drug in 
2000. If the Patent Office issues the patent promptly, but the FDA does 
not approve the product until 2020, the company would have no patent-
based market exclusivity. In 1984 (even before the URAA), Congress 
enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act, which provides for Patent Term 
Extension (PTE) to make up for this delay.10 
B. How Patents are Prosecuted 
To receive a patent, an inventor files a patent application with the 
Patent Office. There are two kinds of applications: provisional and 
nonprovisional. Provisional applications are not relevant to this article. 
An inventor who files a nonprovisional application must include a 
“specification” that describes and enables the invention.11 The application 
5. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (Supp. V 2017).
6. Id. 
7. Id. § 154(b). 
8. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012). 
9. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669–70 (1990). 
10. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (Supp. V 2017). 
11. 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(2)(A) (2012); MPEP § 601 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018). 
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receives a “filing date,” which is the date the Patent Office receives the 
application.12 The filing date of the application is important for several 
reasons, including that: (1) it defines the world of prior art that can be 
raised against the patent13 and (2) the patent expires 20 years from the 
filing date.14 
However, in some circumstances, the effective filing date of an 
application is not the date the application itself was filed, but rather the 
date of an earlier-filed application.15 These situations involve one of the 
three types of applications: (1) continuation applications, (2) divisional 
applications, and (3) continuation-in-part applications.16 
Continuation Applications 
Sometimes, a specification will support numerous different claims. 
For a variety of reasons, the inventor might not want to pursue all the 
possible claims in a single application. For example, the inventor might 
worry that prosecuting all the claims may be expensive or that prosecution 
of more-ambitious claims might hold up the issuance of the less-ambitious 
claims. Consequently, the inventor might choose to prosecute one set of 
claims first. Before the Patent Office issues the patent with the first set of 
claims, the parent patent, the inventor can file a continuation application. 
Even though the continuation application is, technically, filed later, it is 
accorded the same effective filing date as the parent patent. However, the 
disclosure in the continuation application cannot contain new matter.17 
Divisional Applications 
Divisional applications are like continuation applications and also 
cannot include new matter.18 The difference is that an inventor files a 
divisional application to claim an invention that is independent of the 
invention claimed in the parent patent. Sometimes, an inventor will decide 
to file a divisional application on her own based on an independent 
determination that the claims she seeks to pursue in the divisional 
application are distinct from the claims in the parent. For purposes of this 
12. 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(4) (2012). 
13. Id. § 103; see MPEP § 2141. 
14. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (Supp. V 2017).
15. Id. §§ 120–121, 154(a)(2). 
16. MPEP § 201.02 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018). 
17. MPEP § 201.07 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018). 
18. MPEP § 201.06 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018). 
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article, this type of applicant-initiated divisional application is no different 
than a standard continuation application. 
However, the Patent Office often forces a divisional application.19 
Specifically, if an applicant files numerous claims in a first application, 
the examiner might decide that the claims cover distinct inventions, and 
the examiner can then insist that the applicant restrict the claims in the 
first application to a single invention. The inventor can fight this 
restriction requirement, but she can just file a divisional application to 
prosecute the non-elected claims.20 
Continuation-in-Part Applications 
A continuation-in-part application is like a standard continuation 
application, but an inventor is permitted to add new matter to the 
disclosure of a continuation-in-part application. The tradeoff is that the 
claims in the continuation-in-part application are afforded the filing date 
of the parent application only if the parent application contained a 
disclosure that supports the claims in the continuation-in-part 
application.21 
C. The Two Types of Double Patenting 
The Patent Act entitles an inventor to only “a patent,” singular, for 
an invention.22 Accordingly, an inventor cannot have two patents on the 
“same invention.”23 
Even where an inventor is not trying to get two patents on exactly 
the same invention, courts nonetheless forbid an inventor from getting two 
patents with claims to obvious variants of the same invention—ODP.24 
There are several rationales for the prohibition on ODP, and they will be 
discussed at length below. For now, suffice it to make the intuitive point 
that someone who invents one new idea should not be able to both get a 
patent that expires in 2020 and get a second patent on the same or an 
obvious variation of that invention that does not expire until 2030. The 
public is getting cheated out of using the invention (or its obvious variant) 
in an expired patent, and the inventor is getting more patent term than she 
deserves. Another reason, albeit less significant, for prohibiting ODP is 
19. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2012). 
20. See MPEP § 201.06. 
21. See MPEP § 201.08 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018). 
22. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
23. MPEP § 804 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018). 
24. Id. 
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that if an inventor could get multiple patents on the same invention, she 
might sell some patents and keep others. An accused infringer could be 
subject to multiple lawsuits from the owners of the different patents with 
no collateral estoppel on judgments from one to the other—because the 
patent owners would be different.25 
Importantly, Congress forbids ODP rejections for divisional 
applications that an inventor files in response to a Patent Office restriction 
requirement. The parent and divisional patents cannot be used as ODP 
references against one another.26 
Aside from this congressionally enacted safe harbor, courts 
developed a simple ODP workaround for inventors who want to receive a 
second patent for an obvious variation of a previously patented invention. 
The inventor can file a “terminal disclaimer” in which she disclaims the 
term of the second patent that would otherwise extend beyond the term of 
the first patent27—often called the reference patent. So, say the reference 
patent expired on January 1, 2020, the inventor would disclaim the term 
of the second patent on the same or an obvious variant that extended 
beyond that date. To avoid the multiple-lawsuit problem, the Patent Office 
requires that the terminal disclaimer also include a provision that the 
disclaimed patent will not be enforceable if the challenged and reference 
patents are not commonly owned.28 
The interaction between double patenting and PTA/PTE is 
interesting: the Patent Act is explicit that PTA cannot extend a patent’s 
term beyond the date in a terminal disclaimer.29 The Patent Act does not 
say whether PTE can extend the term of a patent beyond a terminally 
disclaimed date, but the Federal Circuit has ruled that it can.30 
II. THE REASON FOR PROHIBITING ODP
Although double patenting has been prohibited for two centuries, 
courts have never settled on a single rationale. Instead, there are two types 
of justifications. One is patentee based: were an inventor allowed to 
receive multiple patents with different expiration dates, the inventor 
would receive more than their congressionally allotted exclusivity. The 
second justification is based on the public’s rights: the public should be 
25. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329, 350 (1971). 
26. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2012). 
27. 37 C.F.R. § 1.321 (2018). 
28. Id. § 1.321(c). 
29. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
30. Novartis AG v. Ezra Ventures LLC, 909 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Merck & Co.
v. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., 482 F.3d 1317, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
8
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free to use claimed inventions (and their obvious variations) once a patent 
expires. The rationale matters. In some cases, the second patent does not 
improperly extend the patentee’s term, but the public is still blocked from 
using an invention in an expired patent. 
A. Courts Give Multiple Reasons for Prohibiting ODP 
Courts have been offering these two different justifications for 
almost as long as the prohibition on double patenting has existed. Perhaps 
the first discussion of double patenting came in dicta in an 1818 case. 
Justice Story (riding circuit) addressed a patentee-based concern over 
double patenting: allowing an inventor to obtain serial patents might 
create “double recompense” and “the term of the exclusive right might be 
prolonged for a great length of time.”31 He therefore expressed “very great 
doubts” whether an inventor could get two patents for the same 
invention.32 
The next year, Justice Story addressed double patenting directly in 
Odiorne v. Amesbury Nail Factory, again riding circuit.33 He held that an 
inventor cannot “have in use at the same time two valid patents for the 
same invention.”34 Justice Story began by again focusing on the patentee-
based problem: Congress awarded inventors a set patent term, but, if an 
inventor “can successively take out at different times new patents for the 
same invention, he may perpetuate his exclusive right during a century.”35 
Justice Story concluded, though, with a public-rights justification: double 
patenting would defeat “the public[’s] . . . acquired . . . inchoate interest” 
in using the invention after the first patent expired.36 
The Supreme Court adopted the prohibition on double patenting at 
least by the middle of the 19th century.37 For example, in O’Reilly v. 
Morse, the Supreme Court explained that Morse could not have two 
patents that “embraced” the same invention—in that case, an 1840 patent 
claiming any method of transmitting information through electromagnets 
and an 1846 patent claiming a specific method.38 However, it was only 
31. Barrett v. Hall, 2 F. Cas. 914, 924 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (No. 1,047).
32. Id. 




37. See, e.g., McCreary v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 141 U.S. 459, 467–68 (1891); Suffolk Co. 
v. Hayden, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 315, 319 (1865). 
38. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 114 (1853); cf. Douglas L. Rogers, Double 
Patenting: Follow-on Pharmaceutical Patents that Suppress Competition, 14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 317, 337–38 (2017). 
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with its 1894 decision in Miller v. Eagle Manufacturing Co. that the Court 
gave any justification.39 Citing Justice Story’s Odiorne decision, the 
Supreme Court listed both problems with double patenting: (1) the 
public’s rights: “the power to create a monopoly is exhausted by the first 
patent,” and (2) the “further,” patentee-based reason: “a new and later 
patent for the same invention would operate to extend or prolong the 
monopoly beyond the period allowed by law.”40 According to one scholar, 
by 1916 most courts were relying on the patentee-based rationale.41 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.), one of the 
Federal Circuit’s two predecessor courts, likewise mixed and matched 
between these two justifications. In one opinion it declared that “[d]ouble 
patenting is . . . primarily intended to prevent prolongation of monopoly” 
by the patentee; otherwise, the patentee could file a first patent with a 
“sketchy forecast” of an invention and continue to file continuations-in-
part to prolong the monopoly.42 But in another opinion it justified ODP 
based on the public’s rights: “when the right to exclude granted by a patent 
expires at the end of the patent term, the public shall be free to use the 
invention.”43 
The Federal Circuit continued providing both justifications. For 
example, the Federal Circuit in Longi quoted Judge Rich for the 
proposition that double patenting exists to ensure that the “public should 
be [free] to assum[e] that upon the expiration of the patent it will be free 
to use not only the invention claimed in the patent but also modifications 
or variants which would have been obvious.”44 On the other hand, Judge 
Rich himself cited Longi and emphasized that ODP exists “to prevent 
improper timewise extension of the patent right” by the patentee.45 
39. Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 198 (1894); see EMERSON STRINGHAM, DOUBLE 
PATENTING § 2800, 25 (Miller is considered “the most famous decision” on double patenting); see 
also RUSSELL WILES, EFFECT ON A LATER BROAD PATENT OF AN EARLIER NARROW PATENT TO THE 
SAME INVENTOR, ON A COPENDING APPLICATION (1905), reprinted in EMERSON STRINGHAM, 
DOUBLE PATENTING 501, 507 (1933) (Miller “is and always has been the leading case upon the 
subject.”). 
40. Miller, 151 U.S. at 198 (citing Odiorne, 18 F. Cas. at 579). 
41. CHARLES H. SHAFFER, DOUBLE PATENTING (1916), reprinted in EMERSON STRINGHAM, 
DOUBLE PATENTING 516, 517 (1933). 
42. In re Braithwaite, 379 F.2d 594, 601 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
43. In re Robeson, 331 F.2d 610, 614 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
44. In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892–93 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Zickendraht, 319 F.2d
225, 232 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (Rich, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
45. In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589, 592 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (second emphasis added). 
10
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B. The Patent Act Assumes a Patentee-Based Justification 
In 1952, Congress enacted § 121 of the Patent Act. This was 
Congress’s first clear recognition of and acquiescence to double 
patenting,46 and § 121 views ODP as a patentee-based problem. Until 
1952, even when an examiner insisted that claims be divided, the claims 
of the divisional application could still be rejected for ODP over the first 
application and vice-versa.47 This was unfair to the patentee—so much so 
that the C.C.P.A. had a rule that “every reasonable doubt appertaining to 
the [double patenting] issue should be resolved in [the patentee’s] favor” 
if the patentee divided her claims in response to a restriction 
requirement.48 In 1952, Congress did away with the problem, adding § 
121, which provides that, when an inventor files a divisional application 
in response to a restriction requirement, one restricted application “shall 
not be used as a reference” against the other.49 This exception to ODP 
addresses only a patentee-based problem: since the inventor is playing by 
the rules (dividing applications when told to do so), it would be unfair to 
the patentee if she had to face a double patenting rejection. Section 121 
does nothing to address the public’s rights. A member of the public will 
still be prohibited from using an invention (or its obvious variant) claimed 
in an expired patent. 
C. Regulatory Provisions Reflect a Public-Rights Justification 
The Patent Office’s regulations, meanwhile, evince a concern for the 
public’s rights. As described above, an inventor can traverse an ODP 
rejection by filing a terminal disclaimer. The 1952 Patent Act provides 
that an inventor can “disclaim or dedicate to the public . . . any terminal 
part of the term . . . of the patent granted or to be granted.”50 The two 
primary drafters of the Act, Pasquale J. Federico and Giles S. Rich, both 
46. William T. Bullinger is thus mistaken in asserting that the 1952 Act “eliminate[d] the law 
of double patenting.” William T. Bullinger, “Double Patenting” and the 1952 Patent Act, 10 PAT., 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. RES. & EDUC. 389, 399 (1966). 
47. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. N. Petrochemical Co., 784 F.2d 351, 358 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (Newman, J., concurring) (citing pre-1952 cases), cited with approval in Boehringer Ingelheim 
Int’l GmbH v. Barr Labs., Inc., 592 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also STRINGHAM, supra 
note 39, § 2851A, 357 (citing cases). 
48. In re Cady, 77 F.2d 106, 108 (C.C.P.A. 1935). 
49. See 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2012). 
50. Id. § 253. 
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explained that terminal disclaimers were created specifically to allow 
inventors to get around ODP rejections.51 
The statute’s disclaimer provision talks about disclaiming terms, but 
it says nothing about common ownership of the two patents. And early 
terminal disclaimers addressed only the patent’s term.52 Extending term 
is both a patentee-based problem and violates the public’s rights. And the 
C.C.P.A. focused on the patentee-based problem: holding that that 
terminal disclaimers would not work in “a situation where any abuse of 
the terminal disclaimer is suggested.”53 
However, the Patent Office ultimately shifted the doctrine to require 
public-rights-specific provisions. In 1971, the Patent Office issued a 
regulation that a terminal disclaimer would overcome a double-patenting 
rejection only if the disclaimer included a provision that the patent would 
be enforceable when the disclaimed patent was “commonly owned with 
the application or patent which formed the basis for the rejection.”54 The 
C.C.P.A. later upheld the regulation, and the common-ownership 
provision is now a standard part of terminal disclaimers.55 The need for 
common ownership makes sense in the public-rights justification. 
Because of collateral estoppel, if the patents are commonly owned, a 
member of the public cannot be sued by the same patent owner for 
infringing the same invention—even if claimed in different patents. 
Common ownership does nothing to address a misbehaving patentee. 
III. THE PATENTEE-BASED AND PUBLIC-RIGHTS JUSTIFICATIONS
DIVERGE FOR EARLIER-FILED/ISSUED BUT LATER-EXPIRING PATENTS 
In addition to the question of divisional applications and terminal 
disclaimers, which are addressed by statute and regulation, respectively, 
the justification for ODP matters in cases where the reference patent is 
51. See Pasquale J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 161, 210 (1993) (reprinting his comments from the 1954 edition of Title 35 of the United 
States Code Annotated) (explaining that § 253 was “contemplated” as a means of “combatting a 
defense of double patenting.”); see also Selected Speeches of Giles S. Rich, 3 J. FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y 
103, 112 (2009) (reprinting his speech to the New York Patent Law Association held on November 
6, 1952) (explaining that one might file a terminal disclaimer “if you are in a double-patenting 
situation.”). 
52. See In re Gibbs, 437 F.2d 486, 487 n.2 (1971). 
53. In re Robeson, 331 F.2d 610, 615 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
54. 36 Fed. Reg. 7312 (Apr. 17, 1971); 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(b) (1972). Before the 1971
promulgation, the Patent Office had an internal rule that a terminal disclaimer had to provide that the 
patent would “expire immediately” if it stopped being “commonly owned.” In re Van Ornum, 686 
F.2d 937, 948 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (quoting 834 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1615 (Jan. 31, 1967)). 
55. Van Ornum, 686 F.2d at 944–48; MPEP § 1490 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018). 
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later-filed (pre-URAA) or later-issued (post-URAA) than the challenged 
patent. 
A. Earlier-Filed but Later-Expiring Patents Before the URAA 
As explained above, before the URAA, a patent’s expiration date 
depended on the date of issue, and, usually, an earlier-issued patent was 
filed earlier too. So double patenting would normally be a problem for 
only the later-filed and later-issued patent. But not always. Sometimes, 
the earlier-filed patent would get held up during prosecution, and a later-
filed patent would issue first. What then? The patentee would argue that 
she should not lose protection just because the Patent Office delayed 
issuing the patent, so the earlier-filed patent should not be subject to an 
ODP challenge from the later-filed patent. On the other hand, the public 
would argue that it should still be free to use the inventions and obvious 
variations of claims in expired patents; the inventor’s tortuous path to 
getting her patent is not the public’s problem. Courts were divided on this 
question of earlier-filed but later-issued patents. 
Suffolk Co. v. Hayden56 
Hayden filed for a patent in 1854, but, “[f]or some cause,” the 
application just lingered in the Patent Office.57 So Hayden filed another 
patent application for the “same improvements” in 1857, which the Patent 
Office issued that same year.58 The earlier-filed 1854 application, 
meanwhile, did not issue until 1860.59 
56. Suffolk Co. v. Hayden, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 315 (1865). 
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Figure 1: Timeline of Hayden’s patent prosecution 
When Hayden sued for infringement of the 1857 patent, the 
defendant argued that the 1857 patent should be invalid for double 
patenting over the earlier-filed but later-issued 1860 patent.60 The 
Supreme Court held that was exactly backwards: “The last [issued], not 
the first, is void.”61 The Supreme Court later summarized Suffolk as 
“deciding that it is the issue date, and not the filing date, which determines 
priority to patents issued to the same inventor on the same machine.”62 
Suffolk, itself, can be reconciled with both patentee and public-rights 
justifications for prohibiting double patenting. The patentee is still getting 
one full term of protection, and the public is still permitted to use the 
invention as soon as one patent expires. However, courts diverged on how 
to apply Suffolk. 
The Thomson-Houston Electric Co. Cases63 
The Second Circuit added nuance to Suffolk’s rule in a series of cases 
relating to Thomson-Houston’s patents. Relying on a patentee-based 
justification for double patenting, the Second Circuit held that, sometimes, 
the earlier-filed but later-issued patent could also be immune to an ODP 
challenge. 
60. Id. at 319. 
61. Id. 
62. Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 197 (1894). 
63. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Winchester Ave. Ry. Co., 71 F. 192 (C.C.D. Conn. 1895); 
Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Elmira & H. Ry. Co., 71 F. 396 (2d Cir. 1896); Thomson-Houston 
Elec. Co. v. Hoosick Ry. Co., 82 F. 461 (2d Cir. 1897). 
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Thomson-Houston applied for a patent in 1887, but that patent got 
tied up in an interference proceeding and only issued in 1893.64 In 1888, 
while that application was pending, Thomson-Houston filed another 
patent that issued in 1890.65 As in Suffolk, this led to a later-filed but 
earlier-issued patent. Suffolk had already held that the patent that issued 
in 1890 was valid, but the question was whether the one that issued in 
1893 might also be valid. The circuit court for the district of Connecticut 
held that the 1893 patent claimed a genus while the later-filed but earlier-
issued 1890 patent claimed a species, and, in such cases, the patentee 
should not “be deprived of his broad patent where the application for such 
patent was made first, and was delayed in the patent office through no 
fault of the inventor. Such a ruling would be a reproach to the law.”66 The 
same patent came up again a few years later (with a different defendant) 
in the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit declared that it “should concur” 
with the Connecticut court if the patents really could be divided into a 
genus versus a species patent, but, in its view, the two patents were to the 
“same invention,” and it invalidated the 1893 patent.67 Other 19th century 
cases are to the same effect.68 This focus on justice to the patentee is, 
naturally, consistent with a patentee-based rationale for ODP. The 
concern that the public will not be permitted to use an invention claimed 
in an expired patent applies independently of whether or how the issuance 
of the first-filed patent got tied up. 
In 1897, the same Thomson-Houston patents were challenged in the 
Sixth Circuit.69 Then-Judge Taft, writing for the circuit, came to the same 
conclusion. He declared that he would not invalidate an earlier-filed 
patent based on the happenstance that the Patent Office delayed issuing 
the patent—through no fault of the patentee—“unless it is required by the 
express words of the statute, or by the express holding of the Supreme 
Court.”70 This, again, is a patentee-based justification. But Judge Taft 
went on. He emphasized that, in the later-filed but earlier-issued 1890 
patent, the inventor “expressly states that he has an application pending 
for the main invention . . . and thus shows beyond peradventure that he 
has no intention of abandoning or dedicating to the public his main 
64. See Winchester, 71 F. at 203. 
65. See id. 
66. See id. at 204. 
67. Hoosick, 82 F. at 466–68. 
68. See, e.g., Eagle Mfg. Co. v. Bradley, 35 F. 295, 298 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1888) (ruling that there 
cannot be double patenting where “the issuance of two patents was not for the purpose of extending 
the life of the monopoly, but was caused by the action of the patent-office.”). 
69. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712 (6th Cir. 1897). 
70. Id. at 724. 
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invention.”71 Thus, the 1890 patent, on its face, informs the public that 
there may be other relevant patent protection. 
Birmingham Cement Mfg. Co. v. Gates Iron Works72 
Other courts of that era disagreed. In 1896, the Fifth Circuit declared 
in dicta that it was “untenable” to treat an earlier-filed but later-issued 
patent any differently than a later-filed and later-issued patent.73 Emerson 
Stringham, in his 1933 treatise DOUBLE PATENTING, agrees.74 
Presumably, they understand the prohibition on double patenting as 
ensuring that the public gets to use inventions (and their obvious variants) 
claimed in expired patents, and they do not accept Judge Taft’s suggestion 
that double patenting should depend on what is disclosed in the 
specification of the challenged patent. 
The C.C.P.A. and Federal Circuit’s Approach 
The C.C.P.A. took a particularly harsh approach to earlier-filed but 
later-issued patents. In In re Griswold, the C.C.P.A. allowed a form of 
patent patricide. Griswold filed a patent application, and while it was 
pending, he filed a continuation-in-part application. The continuation-in-
part application issued first. The examiner rejected the earlier-filed parent 
application for double patenting based on its own child, and the Federal 
Circuit affirmed.75 The child killed the parent. 
That said, in cases where the later-filed application issues first, the 
Federal Circuit applies a modified version of ODP. Normally, the question 
for ODP is only whether the claims in the later-issued patent would have 
been obvious over the claims of the earlier-issued patent (a “one-way” 
test).76 Where the later-filed application issues first, however, an ODP 
rejection is proper only if each set of claims would have been obvious 
over the other (the “two-way” test).77 The Federal Circuit has emphasized, 
71. Id. at 726. 
72. Birmingham Cement Mfg. Co. v. Gates Iron Works, 78 F. 350 (5th Cir. 1896). 
73. Id. at 360. 
74. STRINGHAM, supra note 41, § 2854, 368–72. Stringham is the preeminent scholar on
double patenting. See In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1964).  
75. In re Griswold, 365 F.2d 834, 840 (C.C.P.A. 1966). 
76. In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
77. In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589, 593–94 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing earlier cases). Robert Armitage 
argues that Braat “perverts” the earlier caselaw by allowing the earlier-filed application to ever be 
invalidated. Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Double Patenting. . . But Never Realized 
That You Needed to Ask (From the Makers of Prozac), The “Innovation Act”: Appendix to Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 170, 189 (Oct. 29, 2013). 
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though, that the two-way test is a “narrow exception” limited to the 
“unusual circumstance” where the delay of the earlier-filed application 
was “through no fault of the applicants.”78 The court’s allowance for the 
possibility of patent patricide suggests a public-rights justification for 
ODP, but the mitigating two-way test exists to prevent injustice to the 
patentee. 
B. Earlier-Issued but Later-Expiring Patents After the URAA 
1. District Court and Patent-Office Decisions on Earlier-Issued
but Later-Expiring Patents
The URAA created a new ODP question: can an earlier-issued patent 
be invalidated for ODP over a later-issued (and perhaps even later-filed) 
patent? This question is both troubling and common for continuation 
patents where the parent patent has PTA. If the justification for ODP is 
that the public should be free to use any invention (and obvious variations) 
claimed in an expired patent, then ODP should apply to an earlier-issued 
patent as much as to a later-issued one. After all, the public is equally 
harmed. On the other hand, a patentee who files a later-issuing but earlier-
expiring patent has done nothing wrong. 
The first cases to address the effects of the URAA dealt with 
situations where one application was filed before the URAA and the other 
application was filed after. Because pre-URAA patents expire 17 years 
from issuance, while post-URAA patents expire 20 years from the 
effective filing date, the earlier-issued patent often expired later. Until the 
Federal Circuit’s 2014 opinion in Gilead,79 the Patent Office assumed that 
the later-issued patent could serve as an ODP reference, while district 
courts assumed it could not. 
The Patent Office’s Decision in Ex parte Pfizer, Inc.80 
In 1994 (i.e., before the URAA),81 Pfizer filed for a patent on its 
blockbuster drug Viagra, and it received its ’012 patent in 2002. Several 
drug companies asked the Patent Office to reexamine the patent. On 
78. Berg, 140 F.3d at 1432; accord Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 969 n.7
(Fed. Cir. 2001). Judge Newman believes that the “no fault” rule is too strict. Lilly, 251 F.3d at 973 
(Newman, J., dissenting). 
79. Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
80. Ex parte Pfizer, No. 2009-4106, 2010 WL 532133, at *1 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 12, 2010). 
81. To be precise, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) application was filed in 1994 and the
national entry was in 1996. That suffices for receiving a term of 17 years from issuance. See MPEP 
§ 2701 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018). 
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reexamination, the Examiner rejected one of the claims for ODP over 
three patents by one Campbell—all owned by Pfizer but unrelated to the 
’012 patent. The first, Campbell 270, was filed after the ’012’s priority 
date, but it issued before the ’012 patent. The other two, Campbell 511 
and Campbell 945, were filed and issued after the ’012 patent. Because of 
the URAA, though, all three Campbell patents were set to expire before 
the ’012 patent. 
Figure 2: Timeline of Pfizer’s patent prosecution 
This fact scenario presents two interesting ODP questions. First, can 
Campbell 270, which was filed after the ’012 patent’s parent but issued 
before the ’012 patent, serve as an ODP reference? The parties assumed 
it could—and, at least before the URAA, this was the case.82 Second, can 
Campbell 511 and Campbell 945 serve as ODP references to the ’012 
patent, which was both filed and issued earlier than those two references? 
Before the URAA, an earlier-issued patent would always expire earlier, 
so this was a non-issue. The Patent Office’s Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences held that the URAA changed how ODP works: the ’012 
patent would “exclude the public from practicing” the earlier-expiring 
patents, which “is precisely what obviousness-type double patenting was 
82. See, e.g., Lilly, 251 F.3d at 962, 968–72. 
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intended to prevent.”83 The Board therefore affirmed the ODP rejection 
based on a later-filed and later-issued patent. 
The next year, however, two Delaware district courts came to the 
opposite conclusion—focusing on the fact that the patentee did nothing 
wrong in obtaining the later-issued patent. 
The Delaware District Court Decisions in Brigham and Abbott 
In Brigham & Women’s Hospital Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, 
Inc., two pre-URAA patents, the ’068 and ’003 patents (which happened 
to have their own unrelated terminal disclaimers), were challenged for 
ODP over a later-filed, later-issued, unrelated, post-URAA patent that 
expired earlier, the ’244 patent.84 
Figure 3: Timeline of Brigham’s patent prosecution 
The district court believed there was no reason for the patentee to lose 
patent term based on a “later-filed, later-issued” patent, and it was “not 
persuaded by the Board’s reasoning” in Pfizer.85 There was no reason to 
punish a patentee who obtained “a valid, earlier-granted patent with a 
longer term” or to shorten the “patent protection to which plaintiffs were 
already entitled.”86 
Later that year, in Abbott Laboratories v. Lupin Ltd., another 
Delaware court was faced with a similar situation but with a patent-
83. Ex parte Pfizer, 2010 WL 532133, at *21 (emphasis added). 
84. Brigham & Women’s Hosp. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,761 F. Supp. 2d 210, 214 (D. 
Del. 2011). 
85. Id. at 225. 
86. Id. 
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patricide twist: the ODP reference, the ’930 patent, was a continuation-in-
part of the earlier-filed but later-expiring ’428 patent.87 
Figure 4: Timeline of Abbott’s patent prosecution 
The Abbott court agreed with Brigham and concluded that the ’428 patent 
was immune to an ODP challenge from the later-issued patent because 
there was no “improper gamesmanship by the patentee.”88 
The Patent Office’s decision in Ex Parte Martek Biosciences 
Corp.89 
In 2013, the Patent Office Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the 
successor to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences) had the issue 
come up again. In Martek, an examiner rejected the earlier-filed, earlier-
issued, pre-URAA ’244 patent (not the Merck 244 patent discussed above) 
for ODP over a later-filed, later-issued, post-URAA ’225 patent. Both 
patents were continuations-in-part of a common application filed in 1992. 
87. Abbott Labs. v. Lupin Ltd., No. 09-cv-152, 2011 WL 1897322, at *1 (D. Del. May 19,
2011). 
88. Id. at *9–10 (emphasis added). 
89. Ex parte Martek Biosciences Corp., No. 2012-10020, 2013 WL 3326850 (P.T.A.B. May
21, 2013). 
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Figure 5: Timeline of Martek’s patent prosecution 
The Board believed the relationship between the patents was a 
critical distinction from Pfizer and the two Delaware decisions.90 
According to the Board, Martek should have filed all the claims of the 
later patents in the parent 1992 application, and it was Martek’s fault for 
deciding “to wait to file.”91 It therefore invalidated the claims of the ’244 
patent. Thus, Martek seems to meld a public rights and patentee-based 
justification: since the patentee could have avoided the situation, the 
public’s right prevails. 
2. The Federal Circuit’s broad application of ODP in its 2014
Gilead and AbbVie decisions
In 2014, the Federal Circuit issued two decisions, both of which 
suggested that a later-issued patent could serve as an ODP reference 
against an earlier-issued one based on a public-rights rationale. 
Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd.92 
After the URAA, Gilead filed two unrelated patent applications for 
its Oseltamivir product. The first was filed on February 26, 1996 and 
issued as the ’375 patent on September 14, 1999. The second was filed on 
December 27, 1996 and issued as the ’483 patent on June 9, 1998—that 
is, the second patent was a later-filed but earlier-issued patent. 
90. Id. at *10–11. 
91. Id. at *12. 
92. Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 1530 (2015). 
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Figure 6: Timeline of Gilead’s patent prosecution 
When Gilead sued Natco for infringing the later-expiring 
’483 patent, Natco responded that the ’483 patent was invalid for ODP 
over the ’375 patent.93 Relying on Brigham and Abbott, a New Jersey 
court concluded that Gilead’s later-issued patent could not serve as an 
ODP reference against the earlier-issued one.94 
Natco appealed, and the Federal Circuit reversed.95 Judge Chen 
wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Judge Prost, over a 
dissent by Chief Judge Rader. The dispute centered on the justification for 
ODP. Quoting Justice Story’s second justification for prohibiting double 
patenting, the majority ruled that ODP was “primarily designed” to ensure 
that the “public . . . [has] the right to use the invention at the expiration of 
the term”—and this was the doctrine’s “core principle.”96 Accordingly, 
the majority ruled that, come the expiration of the ’375 patent, “the public 
should have the right to use the invention claimed in the patent and all 
obvious variants of that invention.”97 
The majority recognized that the Supreme Court had previously held 
that an earlier-issued patent could not be challenged based on a later-
issuing patent.98 However, it concluded that this was no longer true. 
Before the URAA, the issue date and expiration date were “inextricably 
intertwined,” and the cases discussing “issue dates” were really using the 
issue date as a “reliable stand-in for the date that really mattered—patent 
expiration.”99 Now, however, only the expiration date mattered.100 
93. Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., No. 11-CV-1455 SDW-MCA, 2012 WL 6697411, 
at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2012), vacated and remanded, 753 F.3d 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
94. Id. at *4. 
95. Gilead, 753 F.3d at 1208. 
96. Id. at 1212 (quoting Odiorne v. Amesbury Nail Factory, 18 F. Cas. 578, 579 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1819) (No. 10,430)) (some citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
97. Id. at 1214 (emphasis added). 
98. Id. at 1215 (citing Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 197 (1894); Suffolk Co. v.
Hayden, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 315, 319 (1865)). 
99. Id. at 1214–15. 
100.  Id. at 1215. 
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 6
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss4/6
2019] OBVIOUSNESS-TYPE DOUBLE PATENTING 1039 
The majority made only two allusions to patentee misconduct. The 
first was a remark in the statement of the facts that Gilead had “crafted” 
two separate chains of applications.101 The second was the majority’s 
second rationale for moving away from focusing on issue dates. The 
majority worried that patentees could play games by filing multiple 
applications with different filing dates and by then allowing the latest-
filed one to issue first.102 
Judge Rader, meanwhile, did not accept the public-rights 
justification. He criticized what he perceived as the majority’s “flawed 
assumption that upon the expiration of a patent, the public obtains an 
absolute right to use the previously-claimed subject matter.”103 Rather, 
according to Judge Rader, the problem with ODP was that a “patentee 
could file successive continuations and obtain additional patent term for 
obvious modifications of its earlier claim.”104 
AbbVie Inc. v. Kennedy Institute105 
Gilead was soon followed by another Federal Circuit case with a 
similar result. The Kennedy Institute owned two related post-URAA 
patents on methods of treating rheumatoid arthritis using a combination 
of two products. The first patent was the ’766 patent, which issued in 
2001. Filed on August 1, 1996, it claimed priority to a 1992 application 
through a continuation-in-part. Thus, the patent was set to expire twenty 
years from 1992, i.e., in 2012. In 2005, the Institute filed a continuation 
of a continuation of this application, which issued as the ’442 patent. This 
time, though, the Institute claimed priority only to the August 1, 1996 
date, so this patent would have been set to expire in 2016.106 Additionally, 
the ’442 patent had 750 days of PTA, and it was therefore set to expire on 
August 21, 2018. 
101.  Id. at 1210. 
102.  Id. at 1214–15. 
103.  Id. at 1219 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (emphases added). 
104.  Id. at 1217 (emphasis added). 
105.  AbbVie Inc., v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology Trust, 764 F.3d 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2014). 
106.  Id. at 1373 n.2. 
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Figure 7: Timeline of the Kennedy Institute’s patent prosecution 
AbbVie had a license on the earlier ’766 patent. When the ’442 patent 
issued in 2010, the Kennedy Institute demanded that AbbVie take a 
license on that patent as well. AbbVie refused and sought a declaratory 
judgment that the ’442 patent was invalid for ODP over the ’766 patent. 
The district court granted the motion,107 and the Federal Circuit affirmed. 
The unanimous opinion, authored by Judge Dyk and joined by Judges 
Wallach and Chen, again emphasized the public’s right: “The ban on 
double patenting ensures that the public gets the benefit of the invention 
after the original period of monopoly expires”—and does not exist just to 
curb potential patentee “abuse[]” based on sequential filings.108 In dicta, 
Abbvie declared that ODP could apply even where one patent expires later 
through no fault of the patentee but rather based on the Patent Office’s 
“examination delays” that lead to “patent term adjustments.”109 
Abbvie did recognize that the patentee might have abused the system. 
It was troubled by the possibility that a patentee, like the Institute, might 
“choose[] to file separate applications for overlapping subject matter and 
to claim different priority dates for the applications.”110 However, 
Abbvie’s holding was not premised on that possibility. 
 107.  AbbVie Inc., v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology Trust, 956 F. Supp. 
2d 429, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 764 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
108.  AbbVie, 764 F.3d at 1373 (emphasis added). 
109.  Id. 
110.  Id. 
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Gilead/AbbVie’s Children 
Gilead and AbbVie made an immediate splash. Practitioners had 
assumed that an earlier-issued patent could not lose term based on a later-
issued one111 (the Patent Office decisions in Pfizer and Martek 
notwithstanding). That was certainly no longer true. The scope of Gilead, 
however, remained unclear. Most significantly, the two patents in Gilead 
were unrelated, and the two patents in AbbVie, although related, claimed 
different effective filing dates. The more common scenario is overlapping 
claims among related patents that have the same effective filing date. This 
will typically happen where the Patent Office takes more time to issue the 
first application in a family, leading to the first patent receiving significant 
PTA. Later continuation patents, meanwhile, are often quickly allowed, 
and they will have little to no PTA.112 In such cases, can the continuation 
commit patent patricide?113 
It did not take long for this issue to come up in district courts, and 
most ruled that the child could kill its parent. These courts all quoted 
Gilead’s language that the primary justification for ODP was to protect 
the right of the public to use inventions claimed in expired patents.114 
Largely, these cases involved a later-expiring pre-URAA patent and an 
earlier-expiring post-URAA patent,115 but one involved only post-URAA 
patents—where the difference in expiration date came from PTA.116 
Judge Robinson’s 2016 decision in Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. v. 
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., refusing to allow patent patricide, is the 
one exception.117 Merck’s pre-URAA ’353 patent was challenged for 
 111.  See, e.g., Laurence H. Posorske & Christopher J. Nichols, Will Novartis and Gilead 
Eviscerate Patent Term Adjustments?, 28(2) INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 11, 13 (2016); N. Scott 
Pierce, Inventorship, Double Patenting, and the America Invents Act, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1613, 
1674–83 (2015); Emily A. Evans & Jill A. Jacobson, Double Patenting Recapitulated, 87 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 625, 630 (2005). 
112.  Posorke & Nichols, supra note 111, at 13. 
 113.  See Amelia F. Baur & Elizabeth A. Doherty, Navigating Through the Obviousness-Type 
Double Patenting Minefield, 10(3) LANDSLIDE 48, 51 (2018). 
114.  Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Breckenridge Pharm., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 3d 578, 586 (D. Del. 
2017), rev’d 909 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2018); MLC Intellectual Prop., LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., No. 
14-cv-3657, 2017 WL 1493025, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2017); Janssen Biotech, Inc. v. Celltrion 
Healthcare Co., 210 F. Supp. 3d 278, 280 (D. Mass 2016); Magna Elecs., Inc. v. TRW Auto. Holdings 
Corp., No. 1:12-cv-654, 2015 WL 11430786, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 10, 2015); DDB Techs., L.L.C. 
v. Fox Sports Interactive Media, LLC, No. A-11-cv-929, 2014 WL 12167628, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 
15, 2014). 
 115.  Novartis, 248 F. Supp. 3d at 578; MLC, 2017 WL 1493025, at *7; Janssen, 210 F. Supp. 
3d at 278; DDB, 2014 WL 12167628, *4. 
116.  Magna, 2015 WL 11430786, at *3. 
 117.  Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 782, 787–88 
(D. Del. Nov. 14, 2016), appeal dismissed, No. 17-1366 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 6, 2017). 
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ODP over its direct continuation—the ’781 patent, which was also a pre-
URAA patent. 
Figure 8: Timeline of Merck’s patent prosecution118 
Because both patents were subject to the pre-URAA rules, the later-issued 
’781 patent would normally expire later. But there was a hitch. During 
prosecution of the ’781 patent, Merck’s application went abandoned, and 
to revive it, Merck had to disclaim the time during which the application 
was abandoned.119 As a result, Merck’s ’781 patent was going to expire 
before the ’353 patent (this is the unicorn of situations for pre-URAA 
patents, where the later-issued patent expires earlier). 
Although both patents were pre-URAA patents, Judge Robinson did 
not find this significant. Instead, she assumed Gilead was applicable but 
distinguished it because of the “particular circumstances” of patent 
patricide: it would not be fair to the patentee for the child patent to be an 
ODP reference against “the first issued parent patent.”120 
3. The Federal Circuit’s Narrow Application of ODP in Its 2018
Novartis Decisions
Last year, the Federal Circuit issued two decisions, coincidentally 
both involving Novartis, that appear to pull back from the Gilead/AbbVie 
framework. The first was Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. 
Breckenridge Pharmaceutical Inc.,121 and the second was Novartis AG v. 
Ezra Ventures LLC.122 
118.  Id. at 787. 
119.  See 37 C.F.R. § 1.137 (2018). 
120.  Merck, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 787–88. 
121.  Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Breckenridge Pharm. Inc., 909 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
122.  Novartis AG v. Ezra Ventures LLC, 909 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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In Breckenridge, Novartis Pharmaceuticals owned two patents 
covering the drug Zortress: the earlier-filed, earlier-issued, pre-URAA 
’772 patent and the later-filed, later-issued, post-URAA ’990 patent—a 
(non-safe-harbored) divisional of the ’772 patent. Because of the URAA, 
the ’772 patent was set to expire later. 
Figure 9: Timeline of Novartis’s Zortress patent prosecution 
The parties agreed that if the ’990 patent was a proper ODP 
reference, then it invalidated the ’772 patent. District Judge Andrews 
believed that Gilead was applicable, and he ruled that there was an ODP 
problem.123 
The Federal Circuit reversed.124 The appeal happened to go to a panel 
that included Judge Chen, who authored the majority opinion in Gilead, 
and (now Chief) Judge Prost, who joined in Gilead. The third judge in 
Breckenridge was Judge Wallach, instead of Gilead’s Judge Rader—who 
had since resigned from the Federal Circuit. 
In a unanimous opinion authored by Judge Chen, the Federal Circuit 
ruled that Gilead was inapplicable for several reasons. The first was that 
Gilead involved two “post-URAA” patents, whereas Novartis had one 
pre- and one post-URAA patent.125 Although this is a distinction, the 
Breckenridge court does little to explain why this this should make a 
difference. 
123.  Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Breckenridge Pharm., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 3d 578, 600 (D. Del. 
2017). 
124.  Novartis, 909 F.3d at 1355. 
125.  Id. at 1358. 
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Breckenridge’s other reason is more persuasive: it argues that there 
was no evidence that the patentee, Novartis, did anything to game the 
system—unlike the patentees in Gilead/AbbVie. Gilead “‘crafted a 
separate “chain” of application,’” which suggests there may have been 
“gamesmanship” on Gilead’s part.126 AbbVie involved “an inventor[] 
seeking to prolong his exclusivity” by filing two patents with “different” 
priority dates.127 In its conclusion, Breckenridge reiterated that ODP 
exists to “prevent a patent owner from extending the exclusivity rights 
over his invention beyond a full patent term. We saw this impermissible 
practice in Gilead and in AbbVie, where the patent owners claimed 
different effective filing dates for different patents (involving related 
inventions) to extend the life of patent exclusivity.”128 Thus, the Federal 
Circuit in Breckenridge was framing Gilead and AbbVie as cases where 
patentees gamed the system by playing with filing dates. Novartis, 
meanwhile, was just filing normal continuation applications that 
happened to expire earlier than their parents, so a later-issued continuation 
patent should not be able to commit patent patricide. Thus, Breckenridge 
does not put much stock in the public-rights justification for ODP. 
The same day that the Judge Chen issued his Breckenridge opinion, 
he also issued another ODP decision in Ezra.129 Novartis held two patents 
covering its drug Gilenya, but the two patents were unrelated to one 
another. One was its pre-URAA ’229 patent, which was filed in 1993 and 
issued in 1997, and the other was its post-URAA ’565 patent, which was 
filed in 1997 and issued in 1999. The ’229 patent was set to expire in 2014, 
and the ’565 patent was set to expire in 2017. Novartis then received PTE 
on its ’229 patent, extending the term until 2019. 
 126.  Id. at 1364 (quoting Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208, 1210 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014)). 
 127.  Id. at 1364–65 (analyzing AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of 
Rheumatology Trust, 764 F.3d 1366, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). 
128.  Id. at 1367. 
129.  Id. 
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Figure 10: Timeline of Novartis’s Gilenya patent prosecution130 
When Novartis sued Ezra for infringing the ’229 patent, Ezra argued 
that the ’229 patent was invalid for ODP. Delaware’s Judge Stark rejected 
Ezra’s argument, ruling that ODP cannot cut PTE short.131 The Federal 
Circuit affirmed. After finding that the statute and its own prior case law 
mandated this result, the Federal Circuit turned to “Ezra’s Policy 
Concerns.”132 It explained that the case “does not present the concerns that 
drove [the] recent decisions” in Gilead and AbbVie.133 Gilead, it 
explained, sought to avoid situations where patentees “orchestrate” longer 
exclusivities, but “Ezra does not identify any similar tactics on the part of 
Novartis.”134 Again, Judge Chen relied on patentee-based justifications 
for ODP and did not put much weight in the public-rights justifications. 
IV. PATENT PATRICIDE IS BAD POLICY BUT NOT UNPRECEDENTED
Patent patricide is sometimes a billion-dollar question. Patents on 
pharmaceutical drugs can be worth billions of dollars a year,135 and these 
130.  Novartis AG v. Ezra Ventures, LLC, 909 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 131.  Novartis AG v. Ezra Ventures, LLC, No. 15-150, 2016 WL 5334464, at *3 (D. Del. Sept. 
22, 2016). 
132.  Ezra, 909 F.3d at 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. at 1375 (quoting Gilead Scis. Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 
2014)). 
 135.  Jamie F. Cárdenas-Navia, Thirty Years of Flawed Incentives: An Empirical and Economic 
Analysis of Hatch-Waxman Patent-Term Restoration, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301, 1347 (2014); 
Verne A. Luckow & Steven C. Balsarotti, Statistical Analysis of Federal District Court Cases Seeking 
Longer Patent Term Adjustments in the Wake of Wyeth v. Kappos, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 1, 21, 44 (2010). 
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patents often have years of PTA.136 So the PTA is worth billions of 
dollars. It is common practice for inventors to file continuation 
applications,137 but if continuation applications can commit patent 
patricide, those continuation applications may not be worth it. 
A. The Federal Circuit’s Inconsistent Signals about Patent Patricide 
Pre-URAA patents are obsolescent. Such patents had to be filed on 
June 7, 1995 and had to issue less than 17 years ago. The billion-dollar 
question is how ODP applies to post-URAA patents that are related. 
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit’s statements provide inconsistent 
guidance. 
Gilead/AbbVie’s Broad Statements 
Although Gilead and AbbVie involved the more troubling situation 
of a patentee filing multiple patents with different priority dates, they both 
rely on the public’s right to use expired patents. The public-rights 
rationale applies just as much to patents having the same filing date as to 
patents that have different filing dates. Moreover, AbbVie (in a 
parenthetical) even discusses the situation of related patents having 
different expiration dates due to PTA.138 Thus, Gilead/AbbVie would 
seem to allow patent patricide even for a standard continuation 
application. 
Breckenridge’s Descriptions of Its Own Scope 
Breckenridge describes its own facts as “present[ing] a narrow legal 
question: can a post-URAA patent that issues after and expires before a 
pre-URAA patent qualify as a double patenting reference against the pre-
URAA patent?”139 The court “conclude[s] under the circumstances of this 
case that it cannot.”140 All these caveats suggest that the Federal Circuit 
does not want to make waves with this opinion. And these are not just 
136.  Luckow & Balsarotti, supra note 135, at 8.  
 137.  See Christopher A. Cotropia & Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Continuing Patent Applications and 
Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office as of Fiscal Year 2017 (Mar. 19, 2018) at 5, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSTITUTE, Research Paper No. 2018-01, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3147056 [https://perma.cc/KXJ5-6KBN]. 
138.  AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology Trust, 764 F.3d 1366, 
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
139.  Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Breckenridge Pharm. Inc., 909 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
140.  Id. at 1361–62. 
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one-off remarks. Breckenridge repeatedly emphasizes that it would be 
unfair for a patentee to lose term based on the URAA’s “intervening 
change in law,” and it emphasizes Congress’s concern with giving pre-
URAA patents their “maximum possible term.”141 None of those reasons 
apply to ODP for two post-URAA patents. 
How the Novartis Decisions Distinguish Gilead and AbbVie 
Breckenridge distinguishes Gilead and AbbVie for two reasons: first, 
those cases involved two post-URAA patents, and second, in those cases 
the patentee played games with the claimed priority dates.142 But what if 
only one of the rationales is present—like a case involving two post-
URAA patents with no gaming of priority dates. Can the child commit 
patent patricide? 
Ezra is similarly ambiguous. The court ruled that there were statutory 
reasons that ODP should not cut PTE short. But it also noted that Novartis 
had not used improper “tactics” to extend its monopoly. Are improper 
“tactics” a requirement for an ODP rejection? 
The Differing Justifications for ODP 
As this article has detailed, there have always been multiple 
justifications for prohibiting ODP: (1) the public has a “right to use the 
invention at the expiration of the term,” and (2) the patentee should not be 
permitted to “perpetuate his exclusive right during a century” where the 
Patent Act limits patent term.143 
This dichotomy is, possibly, the distinction between Gilead/AbbVie, 
on the one hand, and the Novartis decisions on the other. According to 
Gilead and AbbVie, “the bar against double patenting was created to 
preserve that bargained-for right held by the public.”144 By contrast, 
Breckenridge describes the “key purpose” of the ODP doctrine as 
“prevent[ing] a patent owner from extending the exclusivity rights over 
his invention beyond a full patent term,” and both Novartis decisions are 
troubled by the “gamesmanship” in Gilead and AbbVie.145 
141.  Id. at 1357–59, 1364, 1366–67. 
142.  Id. at 1365–67. 
143.  Odiorne v. Amesbury Nail Factory, 18 F. Cas. 578, 579 (C.C.D. Mass. 1819) (No. 10,430) 
(emphasis added). 
 144.  AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology Trust, 764 F.3d 1366, 
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Gilead Scis. Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208, 1212 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014)) (citations omitted; emphasis added). 
 145.  Breckenridge, 909 F.3d at 1362, 1367 (emphasis added); Novartis AG v. Ezra Ventures, 
LLC, 909 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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The justification is critical for how to apply ODP to continuation 
applications. If the reason for ODP is that the public should always be free 
to use an expired patent, then it should not matter whether the expired 
patent is a parent or a continuation. Nor should any of the other factors be 
relevant either: it should not matter whether the expired patent is (1) a pre- 
or post-URAA patent; (2) the earlier-filed or later-filed patent; (3) the 
earlier- or later-issued patent; or (4) related to the challenged patent. Once 
a patent expires, the public is free to use the patented invention and its 
obvious variations. Gilead and AbbVie, which focus on the free-to-use-
upon-expiration rationale, thus suggest a very broad application of ODP. 
By contrast, if the concern underlying ODP is an unfair extension of the 
patentee’s rights, an earlier-filed, earlier-issued patent (at the very least) 
should keep one full patent term independent of whether a later 
application is filed. 
B. The Federal Circuit Should Not Allow Patent Patricide 
At some point, the Federal Circuit will have to decide whether a 
standard continuation application that issues after its parent can serve as 
an ODP reference against its earlier-issued parent. The court should 
conclude that it cannot. First, “the traditional obviousness-type double 
patenting practices extant in the pre-URAA era” was to look at the 
patent’s “issuance date.”146 History thus favors letting an earlier-issued 
patent keep its full term. 
Second, as explained above, §121 of the Patent Act shows that a 
patentee who has done nothing wrong should not be forced to give up term 
for ODP. Allowing patent patricide would do just that. 
Third, in most cases, the later-issuing patent will be the continuation 
patent—a fact that will be evident on the face of the patent.147 A member 
of the public reading the continuation patent will therefore recognize that 
the rights conferred by the patent are subject to the pre-existing rights 
from the parent patent. Therefore, as Judge Taft explained, the public is 
on notice that there may be other relevant patents.148 
Fourth, normally, “the duration of the term of the United States 
patent is fixed when the patent issues.”149 Unless a patentee does 
something that deserves punishment—like the gamesmanship of Gilead 
146.  Breckenridge, 909 F.3d at 1358. 
147.  See 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d) (2018). 
148.  See SHAFFER, supra note 41 (discussing Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 
80 F. 712, 728 (6th Cir. 1897)); accord WILES, supra note 39, at 505 (explaining that double patenting 
should not apply where the reference patent gives “due notice” that it is a follow-on patent). 
149.  Paillard v. Bruno, 29 F. 864, 865 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886). 
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and AbbVie—there is no reason that obtaining a later-issued patent should 
affect the term of an earlier-issued one. Looking to the issue date solves 
this problem: the first-issued patent gets its full term, and the inventor’s 
decision to continue prosecuting applications will not cut that term short. 
On the other hand, ODP still prevents an inventor who already has an 
issued patent from extending her monopoly by receiving PTA on a later-
issued continuation. 
Fifth, a close statutory analogue to ODP shows that patent terms 
should not change after the patent has been issued. In 1839, Congress 
passed a statute that provided that if an inventor received a foreign patent 
six months before filing a U.S. “application,” then the term of the U.S. 
patent would be fourteen years (the statutory patent term at the time) 
“from the date or publication of such foreign letters patent.”150 In Bate 
Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, the Supreme Court explained that the 
1839 Act meant what it said about the U.S. “application” date: so long as 
the U.S. application was filed before the grant of the foreign patent, it did 
not matter when the U.S. patent itself issued.151 The focus on the 
application date seems to reflect a patentee-based concern that the 
inventor should file in the U.S. first. Assuming the inventor does, she will 
get her full patent term independent of which country happens to issue her 
patent first. 
However, in 1870 Congress changed the language to focus on the 
“grant” date instead of the “application” date. Thus, the 1870 Act 
provided that “every patent granted for an invention which has been 
previously patented in a foreign country shall be so limited as to expire at 
the same time with the foreign patent.”152 Under the 1870 statute, the 
Supreme Court explained, it did not matter where the inventor filed first. 
What mattered was where the patent issued first.153 As Bate explained, 
this was a public-rights justification: “the American public became 
entitled to use the invention from the time the foreign public were 
permitted to use it.”154 Notably, even in this public-rights scheme, the 
Supreme Court still accepted that a patent’s term is fixed at the time of 
issuance. A patentee would not lose term if the inventor failed to pay 
foreign maintenance fees after the U.S. patent issued—even though this 
would mean the foreign patent expired before the U.S. one.155 By analogy 
150.  5 Stat. 354, c. 88, § 6 (1839). 
151.  Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 43 (1895). 
152.  Patent Act of 1890, Ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198–217 (July 8, 1870) (emphasis added). 
153.  See Bate, 157 U.S. at 35–36. 
154.  Id. at 36. 
155.  See Pohl v. Anchor Brewing Co., 134 U.S. 381, 385 (1890). 
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to ODP (an analogy that the Supreme Court made),156 once a domestic 
patent issues, its term should be set for ODP purposes independent of what 
happens after. 
Sixth, even if Gilead is right to move away from the issue date, it is 
not clear why the court moved to the expiration date. If, as Gilead claims, 
pre-URAA issue dates were a “stand-in” for expiration dates,157 then, 
logically, courts should now look to the new “stand-in”: the effective 
filing dates. Focusing on the effective filing date is particularly appealing 
given that even before the URAA a minority of courts believed that a later-
filed patent could not serve as an ODP reference against an earlier-filed 
one.158 It bears noting that Gilead’s choice of the expiration date instead 
of the effective filing date was unnecessary to Gilead’s holding. In Gilead, 
the earlier-filed patent was the earlier-expiring one. The choice of the 
expiration-date was dicta. 
Focusing on the priority date instead of the expiration date will often 
be quite important. In cases where two patents have different effective 
filing dates, the approach described above would mean that the one with 
the earlier filing date could not be invalidated for ODP over the one with 
the later date—even if the earlier-filed one was set to expire later because 
of PTA. 
More significantly, in cases where two patents share the same 
effective filing date—as will happen in essentially every continuation 
application—looking to the filing date creates a tie. Before the URAA, 
the rule was that when you had a tie, i.e., when two pre-URAA patents 
issued on the same day, at the very least, the earlier-numbered patent was 
unchallengeable in view of the later-numbered patent, and the majority 
view was that neither patent could be challenged over the other.159 As 
applied to patents with the same effective filing dates, this would mean 
that the earlier-issued patent could not be challenged over the later-issued 
one, and, perhaps, both would be unchallengeable over the other. 
 156.  See Fireball Gas Tank & Illuminating Co. v. Commercial Acetylene Co., 239 U.S. 156, 
160–66 (1915). 
157.  Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 158.  See STRINGHAM, supra note 39, §§ 2804(A), 2804(B), 50–58 (recognizing but criticizing 
this view). For example, the Supreme Court in The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S. 275, 281 (1892), 
writes that “the date of the application and not the date of the patent controls.” In Nat’l Elec. Ticket 
Register v. Automatic Ticket Register Corp., 15 F.2d 257, 257–58 (2d. Cir. 1926), the court 
invalidated one of Sullivan’s patents over his own earlier-filed but later-issued patent. 
159.  See 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS § 9.03(2)(d) (2018); STRINGHAM, supra note 39, §§ 2856, 
2856(A), 379–83. 
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C. Sometimes a Patentee’s Rights Change After Her Patent Issues 
Despite the desire for having a patentee’s rights vest at the time a 
patent issues, the Patent Act does, in at least one circumstance, allow for 
post-issuance events to affect a patentee’s rights. If one patentee receives 
a patent to an invention but a second inventor later decides to file claims 
(from an earlier-filed application) to the same invention, the second 
inventor’s post-issuance decision to amend her claims can, retroactively, 
invalidate the first patent.160 Nevertheless, one troubling law161 does not 
justify another. 
CONCLUSION 
For a doctrine that has existed for two centuries, ODP is a 
surprisingly unsettled area of law. As shown above, much of the confusion 
stems from the differing justifications for ODP. Is the problem that a 
patentee should not be able to unduly extend his or her patent term or is it 
that the public should be entitled to assume that inventions claimed in an 
expired patent are free to the public? 
The implications are immense if an inventor is considering filing a 
continuation application on a patent that has received significant PTA. For 
now, applicants should consider (1) filing many claims in their original 
applications to force restriction requirements, which provide a statutory 
safe harbor from double patenting rejections162; (2) not allowing a 
continuation application to issue; and/or (3) keeping a live continuation 
application to see how the law settles. 
 160.  See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 
2015); id. at 1381 n.2. Even without Dynamic Drinkware, this can happen where an applicant allows 
an earlier-filed application to publish. 
 161.  See In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 537 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (“[W]e will extend the ‘secret 
prior art’ doctrine . . . only as far as we are required to do so.”). 
162.  See 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2012). 
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